FILED

DEC 29 2006

HAROLD S. MARENUS, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

| BAP Nos. CC-05-1352-KMoB |
| STEPHEN LAW, | Bk. No. LA 04-10052-TD |
| Adv. No. LA 04-01666-TD |
| STEPHEN LAW, | Debtor. | Appellant, | Debtor. | Debtor. | Appellant, | Debtor. | Debtor.

Argued and Submitted on November 15, 2006 at Orange, California

Filed - December 29, 2006

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California

Honorable Thomas B. Donovan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: KLEIN, MONTALI and BRANDT, Bankruptcy Judges.

^{*}This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited except when pertinent under the doctrine of law of the case or the rules of res judicata, including issue and claim preclusion. <u>See</u> 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

The debtor, Stephen Law, appeals from an order striking his answer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) and the ensuing entry of default and default judgment. Given the debtor's unambiguous disregard of the bankruptcy court's written orders and oral directives, the court's actions of striking the debtor's answer, entering default, and entering a default judgment was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

The debtor filed a chapter 7 case in January 2004. On September 21, 2004, the chapter 7 trustee filed a first amended complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \S 727(a)(4)(A).

FACTS

The trustee objected to the debtor's discharge because the debtor "knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or account,

¹The procedural history leading up to the trustee's first amended complaint was that on April 8, 2004, Cau-Min Li and the United States Judgment Enforcement Agency filed adversary proceeding 04-1666 against the debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §\$ 523(a)(6) & (a)(19) and 727(a)(3) & (a)(4). On April 12, 2004, Shong-Ching Tong, Yei-Hwei Tong, Cau-Min Li, and the Estate of Robert Shucker filed adversary proceeding 04-1672 seeking relief identical to that in adversary proceeding 04-1666.

In July 2004, a status conference and order to show cause regarding dismissal of adversary proceeding 04-1666 for the plaintiffs' failure to prosecute was held. The plaintiffs in both cases requested that the trustee substitute in as the real party in interest in both adversary proceedings. Per order of the court, the trustee substituted in as the real party in interest in both adversary proceedings, which were consolidated on November 15, 2004.

On September 21, 2004, the trustee filed a first amended complaint whereby only the \S 727(a)(4)(A) claim was pursued. The trustee abandoned the \S 523 claims and the \S 727(a)(3) claim.

by listing" in his Schedule D a fictitious deed of trust as an encumbrance on his property in Hacienda Heights, California.

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The trustee specifically alleged that in June 1999 the debtor made, executed, and delivered to "Lili Lin" a promissory note for the principal sum of \$168,000. To encumber the property and to secure the obligation, the debtor made, executed, and delivered to Lili Lin a deed of trust and assignment of rents. This transfer was the subject of another adversary proceeding (04-1969) and pending appeal (BAP No. CC-05-1303).

On October 26, 2004, the trustee served on the debtor interrogatories (set one), a request for admissions (set one), and a request for production of documents (collectively "Discovery Documents").

On December 29, 2004, the debtor served the trustee with incomplete discovery responses.

On February 24, 2005, the trustee sent the debtor a Stipulation Regarding Discovery Dispute in accordance with Rule 37(a) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(c).² The debtor did not

²Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(c) provides:

For any dispute which may arise under FRBP 7026-7037 or FRBP 2004, counsel shall comply with all portions of this subsection of the Local Bankruptcy Rules unless excused from doing so by order of the court for good cause shown.

⁽¹⁾ Meeting of Counsel. Prior to the filing of any motion relating to discovery, counsel for the parties shall meet in person or by telephone in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute. It shall be the responsibility of counsel for the moving party to arrange for the conference. Unless altered by (continued...)

respond to the Stipulation.

The trustee then filed a Motion to Compel responses to the Discovery Documents in March $2005.^3$

A hearing on the motion was held on April 20, 2005. The court granted the motion, finding:

The Court, having considered the Motion, found good cause for granting same, as it found that the Debtor had not cooperated in attempting to resolve this discovery dispute as required by Loc. Bankr. R. 9013-1(c), that the Debtor's written discovery responses that were attached as Exhibit 2 to the Motion were obstinate and evasive pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

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discovery motion.

²(...continued)

agreement of the parties or by order of the court upon good cause shown, counsel for the opposing party shall meet with counsel for the moving party within 10 days of service upon counsel of a letter requesting such meeting and specifying the terms of the discovery order to be sought.

⁽²⁾ Moving Papers. If counsel are unable to settle their differences, the party seeking discovery shall file and serve a notice of motion together with a written stipulation. This written stipulation shall be formulated by the parties and shall specify, separately and with particularity, each issue that remains to be determined at the hearing and the contentions and points and authorities of each party as to each issue.

. . In the absence of such stipulation or a declaration of counsel of noncooperation by the opposing party, the court will not consider any

^{(3) &}lt;u>Cooperation of Counsel - Sanctions</u>. The failure of any counsel to cooperate in such procedures and to attend the meeting of counsel or to provide the moving party the information necessary to prepare the stipulation required by this Local Bankruptcy Rule within 7 days of the meeting of counsel shall result in the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to the sanctions provided in Local Bankruptcy Rule 1002-2 and FRBP 7037.

³The trustee followed the procedures required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(c) prior to filing its Motion to Compel.

37(2)(a)(3), that the opposition that the Debtor filed to the Motion was not substantially justified, and that the circumstances made an award of sanctions in the amount of \$3,520 against the debtor and in favor of the Trustee just.

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The court ordered that on or before May 18, 2005, the debtor was to provide the trustee with amended discovery responses. The court further ordered the debtor to pay the trustee monetary sanctions of \$3,520 on or before May 20, 2005.

A status conference was held on May 18, 2005. The trustee informed the court that the debtor still had not provided the trustee with the ordered amended discovery responses. The debtor then informed the court that an appeal of the discovery order was pending. The court orally advised the debtor that a pending appeal did not have any effect on his "duties to furnish information" to the trustee.

On May 23, 2005, the trustee sent a letter to the debtor stating that the debtor has yet to provide the trustee with the court ordered responses and monetary sanctions. The debtor responded via letter on May 24, 2005, stating that he had not complied with the court order because it had been "stayed" at the May 18, 2005, hearing. On May 27, 2005, the trustee sent the debtor another letter confirming that the discovery order had not been stayed and that the transcript of the hearing would confirm the lack of stay.

The trustee then filed a Motion to Strike the debtor's answer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) on June 27, 2005, on the grounds that the debtor failed to comply with discovery and the court's discovery order, and had acted in direct contravention of the court's oral directives. The debtor

filed an opposition and sought sanctions of \$800 against the trustee for his "vexatious frivolous tactics."

A hearing was held, and on August 10, 2005, the court granted the trustee's motion to strike the debtor's answer.

Debtor's default was entered on August 31, 2005. On September 15, 2005, the trustee filed a Motion for Default Judgment. A default judgment denying the debtor's discharge pursuant to § 727(a)(4)(A) was granted on September 27, 2005.

The debtor timely appealed the order striking the debtor's answer, the entry of default, and the default judgment.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

16 ISSUES

- (1) Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it granted the trustee's motion to strike the debtor's answer pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C).
- (2) Whether the court abused its discretion when it entered debtor's default and later granted the trustee's motion for default judgment.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a court's ruling on a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) for an abuse of discretion. El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003). A court's decision to impose a default judgment as a sanction is also

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Combs"). Discretion is abused when the judicial action is "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" or "where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. quoting United States

Cellular Inv. Co. of L.A., Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

The only orders presented for review in this appeal are the orders granting the trustee's motion to strike the debtor's answer and the subsequent entry of default and default judgment. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the arguments made with respect to those orders only and do not address arguments of the debtor that are unrelated to those orders.

Rule 37(b)(2)(C) applies in bankruptcy adversary proceedings and provides:

- (2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: . . .
- (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), <u>incorporated by</u> Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037.

The debtor asserts that his discovery responses were "accurate and complete" and that the trustee's complaint is

"groundless and meritless" filed "only for harassment and for their attorney's fees as well as Trustee fees."

Regardless of the debtor's assessment of the adequacy of his discovery responses and of the trustee's motives, the salient points are that the court ordered the debtor to amend his discovery responses and that the debtor did not comply with the order.

At the hearing on the motion to compel, the court determined that the debtor's responses were "not cooperative answers designed to work this case through to a reasonable conclusion. They're not designed to enable the trustee to complete his duties in prosecuting this case."

Further, both the court and the trustee repeatedly explained to the debtor that his appeal of the discovery order had no effect on his duty to comply with the discovery mandate.

Nevertheless, the debtor continued to refuse to "obey an order to provide or permit discovery" and continues to stand firm on appeal that such responses are unnecessary.

Faced with refusal to comply with the court's order, the trustee filed a motion under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) in an effort to invoke the court's power to sanction the debtor as a measure to enforce the court's discovery order.

A determination that an order has been disobeyed is entitled to considerable weight because the trial judge is best equipped to assess the circumstances of the non-compliance. <u>Halaco Eng'g</u> <u>Co. v. Costle</u>, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1988).

The bankruptcy court in this case was familiar with the debtor and was in the best position to assess the circumstances

of noncompliance and to determine what action to take to remedy the trustee's continuous and failed attempts to complete the discovery process. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes the court to strike out pleadings or parts thereof. The court decided that the best action was to strike the debtor's answer.

The record is clear that the debtor repeatedly and purposefully flouted his discovery obligations and violated court orders. See Combs, 285 F.3d at 905-06.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C), the court also had the authority to render a judgment by default. Once the answer had been striken, the trustee moved for entry of default, and later for a default judgment. Based on the debtor's history, we cannot say that the court's decision to order the default judgment and deny the debtor's discharge was an abuse of discretion.

Given the court's extensive experience of dealing with this bankruptcy case, we conclude that the court's action was not "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" and that we cannot say that "no reasonable [person] would take the view" adopted by the bankruptcy court in this situation.

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CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it invoked Rule 37(b)(2)(C) to strike the debtor's answer, enter default, and grant a default judgment thereby denying the debtor's discharge under § 727(a)(4)(A).⁴ AFFIRMED.

⁴The trustee's theory for denial of the debtor's discharge pursuant to § 727(a)(4)(A) rested upon allegations that the debtor "knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or account, (continued...)

4(...continued)

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by listing" in his schedules a fictitious deed of trust as an encumbrance on his property. The offending deed of trust was allegedly made, executed, and delivered to "Lili Lin" to secure a debt to Lili Lin. The trustee filed adversary proceeding number 04-1969 against Lili Lin to avoid and recover the deed of trust as a fraudulent transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 550, 551, and California Civil Code § 3439.04(a). This transfer is the subject of another appeal (BAP No. CC-05-1303) in which it is asserted that there are two Lili Lins - one resident in the United States and one resident in China.

In appeal CC-05-1303, the court approved a compromise between the trustee and an individual claiming to be Lili Lin ("Lili Lin of Artesia"). The debtor and another person claiming to be Lili Lin ("Lili Lin of China") opposed the compromise motion. In the compromise proceeding, the court ruled that the debtor and Lili Lin of China lacked standing to oppose the compromise between the trustee and Lili Lin of Artesia. Lili Lin of China appealed the compromise order.

As we explain in our disposition of BAP No. CC-05-1303, the court's ruling that Lili Lin of China lacked standing to oppose the compromise with Lili Lin of Artesia was not a preclusive determination that Lili Lin of China does not hold a lien on the debtor's property. Hence, the trustee will need to file an adversary proceeding against Lili Lin of China seeking to clear the cloud on title created by her lien claim.

If, after such adversary proceeding is resolved, it is determined that Lili Lin of China does in fact hold a valid lien on the subject property, the debtor may have grounds to revisit the denial of his discharge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure $60\,(b)\,(4)$.